Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable-set solutions in the assignment market
Year of publication: |
2009-11
|
---|---|
Authors: | Núñez, Marina ; Rafels, Carles |
Institutions: | Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) |
Subject: | assignment game | core | dominance | von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set |
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