Voracity, growth, and welfare

This paper explores some implications of the comparison between feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for growth and welfare in a ‘voracity’ model. We show that, as compared to the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium involves a lower growth rate, while it leaves both the leaders and the followers better off, i.e., the Stackelberg equilibrium is Pareto superior to the Nash equilibrium.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Fujiwara, Kenji
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 116.2012, 1, p. 11-14
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Dynamic game \| Growth \| Welfare \| Feedback Nash equilibrium \| Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576430