Vote Buying Through Resource Allocation in a Government Controlled Sector

Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Bennedsen, Morten
Published in:	Rivista di Politica Economica. - SIPI Spa, ISSN 0035-6468. - Vol. 93.2003, 1, p. 49-78
Publisher:	SIPI Spa

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D29 - Production and Organizations. Other ; H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General ; L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises; Privatization; Contracting Out
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558962