Voting as communicating : mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
Year of publication: |
March 2017
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Authors: | McMurray, Joseph |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 102.2017, p. 199-223
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Subject: | Voting | Elections | Mandates | Ideology | Information aggregation | Polarization | Parties | Jury theorem | Public opinion | Swing voter's curse | Turnout | Abstention | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Signalling | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Politische Partei | Political party | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Ideologie | Öffentliche Meinung | Politische Willensbildung | Political opinion formation | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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