Voting for Taxes and Tax Incentives for Giving

We describe a fiscal choice model where individuals vote over levels of proportional income taxation and over tax incentives for giving, and investigate how tax incentives for giving affect political equilibrium outcomes. We show that the availability of tax incentives can cause a regime switch and induce a low income policymaker to select a private provision regime over a pure public provision regime even when the median voter is a donor.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Scharf, K.A.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Subject:	TAXES \| PUBLIC GOODS \| INCENTIVES

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Series:	The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	35 pages
Classification:	H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146947