Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Barberà, Salvador ; Maschler, Michael B. ; Shalev, Jonathan |
Publisher: |
Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Wahlverhalten | Clubtheorie | Spieltheorie | Theorie | Voting | Elections | Clubs | Game theory | Noncooperative games | Pure-strategy equilibrium profiles | Refinements |
Series: | Nota di Lavoro ; 35.1998 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/154893 [Handle] |
Classification: | C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
Source: |
-
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
Barberà, Salvador, (1998)
-
Voting for Voters : A Model of Electoral Evolution
Barberà, Salvador, (1998)
-
Voting for voters: the unanimity case
Shalev, Jonathan, (2003)
- More ...
-
Voting for voters : a model of electoral evolution
Barberà, Salvador, (2001)
-
Voting for voters : a model of electoral evolution
Barberà, Salvador, (1998)
-
Voting for voters : a model of electoral evolution
Barberà, Salvador, (1998)
- More ...