Voting on redistribution with tax evasion

Rainald Borck

This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the middle class.

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Year of publication:	February 2003
Authors:	Borck, Rainald
Publisher:	Berlin, Germany : DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
Subject:	Tax evasion \| redistribution \| voting \| Umverteilung \| Redistribution \| Einkommensteuer \| Income tax \| Abstimmung \| Voting \| Steuervermeidung \| Tax avoidance \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. - Berlin : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1619-4535, ZDB-ID 2125067-4. - Vol. 329
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/18065 [Handle]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H26 - Tax Evasion
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011437454