Voting On Tariff and Retaliation.

In this paper, we analyze the trade war between two large countries when the trade policy is decided through majority voting. We show how the trade war equilibrium depends on the median voter production factor relative endowment. We compare this equilibrium to the one analyzed by Johnson where the trade policy is driven by an utilitarian benevolent dictator.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Van Ypersele, T.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	VOTING \| TARIFFS \| INTERNATIONAL TRADE \| TRADE

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	24 pages
Classification:	F10 - Trade. General ; F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations ; F14 - Country and Industry Studies of Trade
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779456