Voting over Economic Plans.
The authors review and provide motivation for a one-sector model of economic growth in which decisions about capital accumulation are made by a political process. If it is possible to commit for at least three periods into the future, then, for any feasible consumption plan, there is a perturbation that is majority-preferred to it. Furthermore, plans that minimize the maximum vote that can be obtained against them yield a political business cycle. If it is impossible to commit, voters select the optimal consumption plan for the median voter. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
Year of publication: |
1995
|
---|---|
Authors: | Boylan, Richard T ; McKelvey, Richard D |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 85.1995, 4, p. 860-71
|
Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Boylan, Richard T, (2009)
-
The Effect of Punishment Severity on Plea Bargaining
Boylan, Richard T, (2012)
-
Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying.
Boylan, Richard T, (2002)
- More ...