Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods
Abstract We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple theoretical model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. We show that if we allow agents to vote for any method within a rich domain of piece-wise linear methods, then a majority voting equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if most voters have income below mean income then each method within the domain can be supported in equilibrium.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. |
Published in: |
Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 47.2011, 1, p. 29-36
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Voting Taxes Majority Single-Crossing Talmud |
Saved in:
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