Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint
Year of publication: |
December 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Brett, Craig ; Weymark, John Allan |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 67.2016, p. 18-31
|
Subject: | Mirrlees tax problem | Nonlinear income taxation | Political economy of taxation | Redistributive taxation | Voting over tax schedules | Einkommensteuer | Income tax | Optimale Besteuerung | Optimal taxation | Steuertheorie | Theory of taxation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Umverteilung | Redistribution | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour |
-
Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint
Brett, Craig, (2016)
-
Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
Brett, Craig, (2020)
-
Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
Brett, Craig, (2017)
- More ...
-
Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
Bierbrauer, Felix, (2011)
-
How optimal nonlinear income taxes change when the distribution of the population changes
Brett, Craig, (2011)
-
Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
Bierbrauer, Felix, (2013)
- More ...