Voting Power in the European Central Bank

This paper investigates the power distribution in the actual and in an enlarged European Central Bank. By applying two different power indices (PI) it is shown that none of the voting rules described in the ECB statute yields a fair distribution of power. Moreover, it is demonstrated how the voting weights have to be reallocated in order to achieve a fair distribution of power. For that purpose a simple search algorithm is presented.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Brueckner, Matthias
Published in:	Homo Oeconomicus. - Institute of SocioEconomics. - Vol. 17.2000, p. 57-66
Publisher:	Institute of SocioEconomics

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812340