Voting procedures for electing a single candidate : proving their (in)vulnerability to various voting paradoxes
Year of publication: |
[2018] ; 1st edition 2018
|
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Authors: | Felsenthal, Dan S. ; Nurmi, Hannu |
Publisher: |
Cham : Springer |
Subject: | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
Description of contents: | Table of Contents [gbv.de] ; Description [deposit.dnb.de] ; Description [springer.com] |
Extent: | xv, 134 Seiten 23.5 cm x 15.5 cm |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
ISBN: | 978-3-319-74032-4 ; 3-319-74032-6 ; 978-3-319-74033-1 |
Other identifiers: | 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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