Voting with preferences over margins of victory
This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative, providing a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in [Alesina, Alberto, Rosenthal, Howard, 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge] and the benefit of voting function in [Llavador, Humberto, 2006. Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention. Social Choice and Welfare 27 (1), 55-81]. Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Llavador, Humberto |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 56.2008, 3, p. 355-365
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Margin of victory Mandates Plurality Abstention Strategic voting |
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