Wage bargaining and incentive compatibility: is unemployment optimal after all?
Year of publication: |
2000
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wirl, Franz |
Published in: |
Optimization, dynamics, and economic analysis : essays in honor of Gustav Feichtinger. - Heidelberg [u.a.] : Physica-Verl., ISBN 3-7908-1295-1. - 2000, p. 200-213
|
Subject: | Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes | Collective bargaining theory | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Unemployment insurance | Mindestlohn | Minimum wage | Arbeitsproduktivität | Labour productivity | Arbeitslosigkeit | Unemployment | Hysterese | Hysteresis | Theorie | Theory |
-
Productivity response to a contract change
Jayaraman, Rajshri, (2014)
-
Awareness of general equilibrium effects and unemployment
Gersbach, Hans, (2001)
-
Three essays on worker turnover and incentive contracts in labour market search equilibrium
Zaharieva, Anna, (2010)
- More ...
-
Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity--The case of Nabucco and its open season
Pickl, Matthias, (2011)
-
Taxing incumbent monopoly to foster entry
Wirl, Franz, (2011)
-
China’s foreign oil policy: genesis, deployment and selected effects
Christie, Edward Hunter, (2010)
- More ...