Wage Bargaining and Management Opposition in the Presence of Productivity Gains and Organization Costs
Year of publication: |
1997-10
|
---|---|
Authors: | Riedl, Arno |
Institutions: | Department of Economics and Finance Research and Teaching, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) |
Subject: | Wage Bargaining | Management Opposition | Productivity Gains | Organization Costs |
Extent: | application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 49 36 pages |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining. General ; J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives Structure, and Effects |
Source: |
-
Riedl, Arno, (1997)
-
Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations
Houba, Harold, (1998)
-
Let's take bargaining models seriously: The decline in union power in Germany, 1992 - 2009
Hirsch, Boris, (2011)
- More ...
-
Weakening the Weak may Harm the Strong. A Bargaining Model where Opting-In is Costly
Riedl, Arno, (1995)
-
Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game
Okada, Akiro, (1999)
-
Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets
Fehr, Ernst, (1995)
- More ...