Wage bargaining and turnover costs with heterogeneous labour : the no-screening case

by Jon Strand (Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway)

We study the effects of mobility costs in a model of wage bargaining between workers and firms, where there is instantaneous matching, free firm entry, heterogeneous labour, and workers' individual productivities are discovered by firms only after being hired. We derive the employment level and the minimum quality standard, in the market solution and in the socially efficient solution.

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Year of publication:	May 1998
Authors:	Strand, Jon
Publisher:	Oslo, Norway : Department of Economics, University of Oslo
Subject:	wages \| bargaining \| labour market \| Tarifverhandlungen \| Collective bargaining \| Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes \| Collective bargaining theory \| Arbeitsmarkt \| Labour market \| Arbeitskosten \| Labour costs

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten)
Series:	Memorandum / Department of Economics, University of Oslo. - Oslo : Department of Economics, University of Oslo, ISSN 0809-8786, ZDB-ID 2532549-8. - Vol. 1998/14
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
ISBN:	82-570-9150-6
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/90801 [Handle]
Classification:	J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J62 - Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011518874