Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation

This article intends to apply the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a vertically differentiated oligopoly and to study its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the resulting wage bargaining structure is likely to lead to another source of distortion that adds to the classical one derived by oligopoly pricing and quality choice.

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Year of publication:	2002-12
Authors:	BACCHIEGA, Emanuele
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	vertical differentiation \| workers’ skills \| wage bargaining \| welfare

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CORE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2002076
Classification:	L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065296