Wage negotiation, employee effort, and firm profit under output-based versus fixed-wage incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Kuang, Xi Jason ; Moser, Donald V. |
Published in: |
Contemporary accounting research : a journal of the Canadian Academic Accounting Association. - Toronto : CAAA, ISSN 0823-9150, ZDB-ID 18215-1. - Vol. 28.2011, 2, p. 616-642
|
Subject: | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Tarifverhandlungen | Collective bargaining | Austauschtheorie | Social exchange theory | Arbeitsleistung | Job performance | Gewinn | Profit |
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