Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment
Without transparency about peer wages in a real effort experiment, a change of wages does not affect performance. With transparency, however, higher paid workers tend to work more accurately, and lower paid workers shirk more under piece rates.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Greiner, Ben ; Ockenfels, Axel ; Werner, Peter |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 111.2011, 3, p. 236-238
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Labor market experiments Real effort Social comparison Wage schemes |
Saved in:
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