Wages and Employment With Firm-Specific Seniority
We examine wages and employment for junior and senior workers when seniority is firm-specific. We show that if workers are risk averse, the firm chooses both the junior and senior wage independently of the wage offers received by its workers from other firms. Junior workers are paid less than the value of their marginal product and senior workers are paid more. If the firm can monitor its workers' outside offers, it will choose to lay off workers with good offers, but which, nevertheless, may not be so good as its own senior wage.
Year of publication: |
1983
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ioannides, Yannis M. ; Pissarides, Christopher A. |
Published in: |
Bell Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0361-915X. - Vol. 14.1983, 2, p. 573-580
|
Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Monopsony and the lifetime relation between wages and productivity
Ioannides, Yannis M., (1985)
-
Is the Greek crisis one of supply or demand?
Ioannides, Yannis M., (2015)
-
Meghir, Costas, (1989)
- More ...