Warum haben marktwirtschaftliche Instrumente im internationalen Umweltschutz kaum eine Chance?
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Endres, Alfred ; Finus, Michael |
Published in: |
Konjunkturpolitik : applied economics quarterly ; Zeitschrift für angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung. - Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, ISSN 0023-3498, ZDB-ID 3250-5. - Vol. 46.2000, 4, p. 303-326
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Subject: | Internationale Umweltpolitik | International environmental policy | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Koalition | Coalition | Theorie | Theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | German |
Notes: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: "Why are market-based instruments hardly applied in international environment protection?" In: Konjunkturpolitik |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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