"Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring"
Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have a wide range of applications, but a complete characterization of all equilibria in this class of games has yet to be obtained. The existing literature has identified a relatively tractable subset of equilibria. The present paper introduces the notion of weakly belief-free equilibria for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This is a tractable class which subsumes, as a special case, a major part of the existing literature (the belief-free equilibria), and it is shown that this class can outperform the equilibria identified by the previous work.
Year of publication: |
2007-04
|
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Authors: | Kandori, Michihiro |
Institutions: | Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy (CIRJE), Faculty of Economics |
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