Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information (*)
We study the welfare properties of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information, establishing an equivalence between asymptotically expost individually rational and asymptotically (ex-ante, interim and ex-post) efficient equilibrium sequences. <!--ID="" Correspondence to:O. Yosha-->
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Yosha, Oved ; Serrano, Roberto |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 8.1996, 1, p. 167-175
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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