Welfare and Non-linear Pricing in a Cournot Oligopoly.
A simple second degree price discrimination model involving nonlinear pricing of packets of a homogeneous product is shown to exhibit a welfare loss compared to the situation when nonlinear pricing is prohibited. The result holds for a Cournot oligopoly as well as monopoly. Further analysis considers the welfare loss from the market supplying "too large" a packet. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
1991
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Authors: | Ireland, Norman J |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 101.1991, 407, p. 949-57
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
Saved in:
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