Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Apesteguia, Jose ; Ballester, Miguel A.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 115.2012, 2, p. 172-174
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	School choice \| Naive players \| Welfare \| Veil of ignorance

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D0 - Microeconomics. General ; D6 - Welfare Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041682