Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms.
It is assumed in this paper that habits and social norms constrain the influence of economic disincentives on individual behavior but that these constraints themselves may subsequently be influenced by the very same disincentives. It is also assumed that an individual is more likely to obey such habits and norms if many individuals in society do so. Though such constraints on economic behavior usually recede only gradually in response to changes in economic incentives, it is argued that major macroeconomic shocks may drastically speed up the process (a 'ketchup effect'). These features may generate multiple equilibria and vicious dynamics. Copyright 1995 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Lindbeck, Assar |
Published in: |
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 1467-9442. - Vol. 97.1995, 4, p. 477-94
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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