What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? : a test of the inequality aversion hypothesis
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Jacquemet, Nicolas ; Zylbersztejn, Adam |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 18.2014, 4, p. 243-264
|
Subject: | Coordination failure | Subgame perfectness | Non-credible threats | Laboratory experiments | Social preferences | Inequality aversion | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Gerechtigkeit | Justice |
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