What limits escalation? - Varying threat power in an ultimatum experiment
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fellner, Gerlinde ; Güth, Werner |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 80.2003, 1, p. 53-60
|
Subject: | Macht | Power | Strafe | Punishment | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory |
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