What Makes Strong Federalism Seem Weak? Fiscal Resources and Presidential-Provincial Relations in Argentina
This article revives an unresolved political debate now masquerading as an empirical puzzle: how can we characterize the nature of Argentine federalism when recent presidential administrations support conflicting conclusions about it? Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999) easily pushed through policy changes with the support of governors and provincial delegates in congress, implying that federalism is weak. Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001) faced considerable provincial and congressional opposition, implying that federalism is strong. To resolve this puzzle, I recast federalism in terms of its economic context. I argue that economic growth renders presidential-provincial relations positive-sum, leading to intergovernmental cooperation and the appearance of weak federalism. Economic decline turns presidential-provincial relations zero-sum, raising intergovernmental conflict, and the appearance of strong federal institutions. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Benton, Allyson L. |
Published in: |
Publius: The Journal of Federalism. - Oxford University Press, ISSN 0048-5950. - Vol. 39.2009, 4, p. 651-676
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Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
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