What matters to performance? Structural and institutional dimensions of water utility governance
A prolific theoretical and empirical literature has examined the relevance of structures and institutions to public utility performance, with a particular emphasis on the discrete role of ownership. The empirical findings are inconsistent and mostly indeterminate. A narrow emphasis on ownership deflects attention from the inextricable role of governance. The impact of privatization may be marginal compared with alternative governance reforms. Offered here is an informal, practical, and parsimonious conceptual model that distinguishes between structural (endogenous) and institutional (exogenous) governance. Three structural dimensions (ownership form, practice standards, and enterprise autonomy) are juxtaposed against three institutional dimensions (market contestability, external review, and economic regulation). Each dimension may be complementary or substitutive. Given persistent monopoly, privatization may be unnecessary and will be insufficient for ensuring performance. Economic regulation is a prerequisite for privatization but privatization is not a prerequisite for reform. Focusing on the US water sector, this paper offers a descriptive analysis for understanding why this is the case. A pragmatic approach is to strengthen core governance capacities in relation to performance priorities, which ultimately matter most of all.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Beecher, Janice A. |
Published in: |
International Review of Applied Economics. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 0269-2171. - Vol. 27.2013, 2, p. 150-173
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Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
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