What Occupational Safety Tells Us about Political Power in Union Firms
This article tests hypotheses on the distribution of power within unionized firms by measuring which workers' preferences determine the level of firm-supplied occupational safety. An egalitarian model in which all workers have equal impact can be easily rejected, as can a median-worker model. The dominant groups appear to be the most senior workers with more than ten years of seniority and recently hired workers with three or fewer years of seniority. This suggests that unions pursue the objectives of the most senior workers while management tries to set a safety level that is attractive to the more mobile workers.
Year of publication: |
1990
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Authors: | Kahn, Shulamit |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 21.1990, 3, p. 481-496
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Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
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