When and why do countries break their national fiscal rules?
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Reuter, Wolf Heinrich |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 57.2019, p. 125-141
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Subject: | Compliance | Deficit bias | Fiscal institutions | National numerical fiscal rules | EU-Staaten | EU countries | Finanzpolitik | Fiscal policy | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Haushaltsdefizit | Budget deficit | Öffentlicher Haushalt | Public budget |
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