When are Nash equilibria independent of the distribution of agents' characteristics?
Year of publication: |
1985
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bergstrom, Theodore C. |
Other Persons: | Varian, Hal R. (contributor) |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 52.1985, 4, p. 715-718
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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