When Banks Strategically React to Regulation: Market Concentration as a Moderator for Stability
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Schliephake, Eva |
Institutions: | Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: |
-
Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition
Schliephake, Eva, (2010)
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When Banks Strategically React to Regulation: Market Concentration as a Moderator for Stability
Schliephake, Eva, (2014)
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Schliephake, Eva, (2014)
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Political Economy of Banking Regulation
Buck, Florian, (2012)
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Schliephake, Eva, (2014)
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Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition
Schliephake, Eva, (2010)
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