When can we expect a Corporate Leniency Program to result in fewer cartels?
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Harrington, Joseph Emmett ; Chang, Myong-hun |
Published in: |
The journal of law & economics. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 0022-2186, ZDB-ID 218304-3. - Vol. 58.2015, 2, p. 417-449
|
Subject: | Wettbewerbsaufsicht | Competition authority | Kartell | Cartel | Straffreiheit | Exemption from punishment | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States |
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