When do auctions ensure the welfare-maximizing allocation of scare inputs?
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Mayo, John W. ; Sappington, David Edward Michael |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 47.2016, 1, p. 186-206
|
Subject: | Preiswettbewerb | Price competition | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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