When do creditors with heterogeneous beliefs agree to run?
Year of publication: |
April 2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Krishenik, Andrey ; Minca, Andreea ; Wissel, Johannes Stefan |
Published in: |
Finance and stochastics. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0949-2984, ZDB-ID 1356339-7. - Vol. 19.2015, 2, p. 233-259
|
Subject: | Liquidity risk | Credit risk | Nash equilibrium | Bank run | Kreditrisiko | Bankenkrise | Banking crisis | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Bankenliquidität | Bank liquidity | Nash-Gleichgewicht |
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