When Does Communication Improve Coordination?
Year of publication: |
2007-11-27
|
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Authors: | Ellingsen, Tore ; Östling, Robert |
Institutions: | Economics Institute for Research (SIR), Handelshögskolan i Stockholm |
Subject: | Pre-play communication | cheap talk | coordination | level-k | cognitive hierarchy |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Published in American Economic Review, 2010, pages 1695-1724. The text is part of a series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance Number 680 30 pages |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: |
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