When higher prizes lead to lower efforts : the impact of favoritism in tournaments
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Herbertz, Claus Ortwin ; Sliwka, Dirk |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 120.2013, 2, p. 188-191
|
Subject: | Incentives | Favoritism | Nepotism | Tournaments | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Patronage | Clientelism | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Anreiz | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Wettbewerb | Competition | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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