When is an antitrust authority not aggressive enough in fighting cartels?
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Harrington, Joseph Emmett |
Published in: |
International journal of economic theory. - Richmond, Vic. : Wiley Publishing Asia, ISSN 1742-7355, ZDB-ID 2206587-8. - Vol. 7.2011, 1, p. 39-50
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Subject: | Kartell | Cartel | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law | Theorie | Theory |
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