WHEN IS IT OPTIMAL TO DELEGATE: THE THEORY OF FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Celik, Levent ; Karabay, Bilgehan ; McLaren, John |
Published in: |
Working paper / National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. - Cambridge, Mass, ISSN 0898-2937, ZDB-ID 12239057. - 2012, 17810
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