When is it optimal to delegate : the theory of fast-track authority
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Celik, Levent ; Karabay, Bilgehan ; McLaren, John |
Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 7.2015, 3, p. 347-389
|
Subject: | Außenwirtschaftspolitik | Foreign economic policy | Handelsabkommen | Trade agreement | Protektionismus | Protectionism | Wettbewerb | Competition | Freihandel | Free trade | USA | United States |
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