When lack of accountability allows observing unobservables : moral hazard in sub-national government credit markets in Mexico
Year of publication: |
March 2018
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Authors: | Hernández Trillo, Fausto |
Published in: |
Applied economics letters. - Abingdon : Routledge, ISSN 1350-4851, ZDB-ID 1181036-1. - Vol. 25.2018, 5, p. 326-330
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Subject: | Moral hazard | information asymmetries | credit markets | sub-national governments | debt | Mexico | Moral Hazard | Mexiko | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kreditmarkt | Credit market | Öffentliche Schulden | Public debt |
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