When less information is good enough : experiments with global stag hunt games
Year of publication: |
September 2018
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Authors: | Van Huyck, John Bronston ; Ajalavat Viriyavipart ; Brown, Alexander L. |
Published in: |
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1386-4157, ZDB-ID 1386451-8. - Vol. 21.2018, 3, p. 527-548
|
Subject: | Stag hunt | Global games | Efficiency | Equilibrium selection | Threshold strategies | Risk dominance | Payoff dominance | Experiments | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Risiko | Risk |
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