When less is more : rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Faravelli, Marco ; Stanca, Luca M. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 74.2012, 1, p. 170-183
|
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking |
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