When pegging is a commitment device : revisiting conventional wisdom about currency crises
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tarashev, Nikola A. ; Zabai, Anna |
Published in: |
Journal of international economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-1996, ZDB-ID 120143-8. - Vol. 118.2019, p. 233-247
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Subject: | Currency crises | Global games | Inflation bias | Intertemporal trade-offs | Währungskrise | Currency crisis | Inflation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Wechselkurspolitik | Exchange rate policy |
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