When Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation
We introduce labor contracts in a framework of optimal redistribution: firms have some local market power and try to discriminate among heterogeneous workers. In this setting we show that if the firms have perfect information, i.e., they perfectly discriminate against workers and take all the surplus, the best tax function is flat. If firms have imperfect information, i.e., if they offer incentive contracts, then (under some assumptions) the best redistributive taxation is regressive. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | HARITON, CYRIL ; PIASER, GWENAĆL |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 9.2007, 4, p. 589-606
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Publisher: |
Association for Public Economic Theory - APET |
Saved in:
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