When should governments reveal criminal histories?
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Simundza, Daniel |
Published in: |
Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with European Association of Law and Economics .... - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1555-5879, ZDB-ID 2191851-X. - Vol. 12.2016, 2, p. 311-331
|
Subject: | Criminal Registries | Notification Policies | Deterrence | Labor Productivity | Arbeitsproduktivität | Labour productivity | Kriminalität | Crime | Kriminalpolitik | Criminal policy | Kriminalitätsökonomik | Economics of crime | Strafe | Punishment | Theorie | Theory |
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