Which banks choose deposit insurance? : Evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard in a voluntary insurance system
Year of publication: |
1995
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wheelock, David C. |
Other Persons: | Kumbhakar, Subal (contributor) |
Published in: |
Journal of money, credit and banking : JMCB. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0022-2879, ZDB-ID 218362-6. - Vol. 27.1995, 1, p. 186-201
|
Subject: | Kansas | Einlagensicherung | Deposit insurance | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
-
Gürkaynak, Refet S., (2023)
-
Banking regulation and collateral screening in a model of information asymmetry
Hemingway, Benjamin, (2020)
-
How can Croatia's deposit insurance system be improved?
Faulend, Michael, (2005)
- More ...
-
"The slack banker dances" : deposit insurance and risk-taking in the banking collapse of the 1920s
Wheelock, David C., (1992)
-
"The slack banker dances" : deposit insurance and risk-taking in the banking collapse of the 1920s
Wheelock, David C., (1994)
-
Wheelock, David C., (1991)
- More ...